Science as a Vocation, Philosophy as a Religion

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Abstract
When Max Weber delivered his “Science as a Vocation” lecture in 1917, it was to an audience of students facing war and political conflict, and shaped by its membership of activist youth groups whose ideologies were informed by left-Hegelianism. Resisting the clamor for a political message that would light the path to a progressive future, Weber told the students that such philosophical prophecy betrayed the office of the scholar. This consisted in transmitting the “value free” methods that characterized empirical fields, and the ethical disciplines that students had to undergo in order to master these methods. The paper argues that when the Frankfurt School rejected Weber’s approach it did so on the basis of a critique that amounted to a cultural-political attack grounded in the left-Hegelianism that he had repudiated.

Keywords: Weber; Frankfurt School; scholarship; ethics; Hegelianism.

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1 Introduction

In 1964, at the onset of a transnational left-wing student movement, a group of German sociologists met in Heidelberg to celebrate the centenary of Max Weber’s birth, some of them by repudiating his conception of value-free scholarship (Stammer, 1965; 1971). Summarizing the views of the Frankfurt School contingent in this regard, Jürgen Habermas declared that Weber’s conceptions of value freedom and objectivity had resulted from his failure to integrate normative theory and social description. In a diagnosis that would remain unshorn by remorseless repetition, Habermas argued that this failure was in turn conditioned by Weber’s acceptance of a neo-Kantian conception of values as objects of pure choice, and a technical conception of rationality, understood as the instrumental procedures required to reach a predetermined end or purpose (Habermas, 1971). Weber had argued that it was possible for sociology to provide a value-free description of a socio-economic phenomenon such as capitalism, including an account of the role of certain values in its genesis, as in his account of the role of “ascetic Protestantism” in this regard. But he was emphatic that it was not intellectually honest to draw value-judgments about capitalism from such an account, or to conceive of society itself as generating such judgments through some kind of reflexive self-theorization (Weber, 1917; 1949). Should Weber have been right about this, then the whole left-Hegelian movement that had taken up residence in the Frankfurt School would have been threatened, for this movement was dedicated to the idea that society did indeed throw up the forms of its own theorization and evaluation. For Habermas this occurred via what he called “learning processes”. These were forms of “communicative reason” or public deliberation through which democratic citizenries progressively achieved the kind of intersubjective agreement about social and political norms that Kant had originally located in the transcendental consensus of “rational beings” (Habermas, 1981, pp. 8–42).

In what follows it will be shown that rather than being based in a scientific or scholarly investigation of Weber’s intellectual sources and methods, the Frankfurt School critique of his conception of “scientific” (wissenschaftlich) value-freedom was in fact the brute assertion of a radically opposed “spiritual” outlook grounded in a sectarian cultural politics. Rather than being a verifiable scholarly account of Weber’s way of thinking, the thesis that lay at the heart of this critique — the notion that Weber’s conception of value-freedom was symptomatic of his failure to achieve the dialectical mediation of “positivist” social science and “decisionist” ethical voluntarism — was a left-Hegelian intellectual weapon designed to eliminate it. In order to understand how Weber actually conceived of value-freedom, and how this conception came to be so fiercely attacked by social theorists working with the tools of German dialectical philosophy, it is necessary to discuss the circumstances of academic combat in which he formulated and defended it, and also the broader intellectual, cultural and political cross-currents that swept into this context. For these purposes, the essay will begin with an account of the circumstances in which Weber presented his famous Wissenschaft als Beruf (“Science as a Vocation”) lecture to Munich university students in 1917, before offering a description of the cultural politics involved in the attack on Weber launched by Habermas and the Frankfurt School.

2 Teen Spirit

As Keith Tribe explains in his article in this issue of the journal (2018), Weber’s invitation to address students in Munich was issued by the Bavarian branch of the Freistudentische Bund (free students’ association FSB). The key figures here were Immanuel Birnbaum and Alexander Schwab, who themselves formed part of a radical educational-reform faction of the FSB that included Walter Benjamin. Initially conceived by the FSB as part of a series in which celebrated German professors would address the theme of Geistige Arbeit als Beruf (“intellectual work as a vocation”), Weber’s Wissenschaft als Beruf of 1917 appears to have been one of only two lectures that actually were delivered, the second being his Politik als Beruf (“Politics as a Profession”) presented in Munich in 1919, when Weber had taken up a chair at the university (Mommsen & Schlucht, 1992).

Standing in opposition to the ultra-nationalist Deutsch-Völkische Studentenverband (ethnic-German student association), the FSB formed part of the liberal wing of a broader German youth movement that had begun in the 1890s and grew steadily until the war years (Dudek, 2002, pp. 7–39). Like the youth movement of the 1960s, the fin de siècle German Freideutsch or Freistudenten movement consisted of a loose
coalition of disparate youth groups. In Germany these groups were linked primarily by the fact that their student members sought an association independent of the official student corps (Burschenschaften), whose social exclusivity, anti-semitic stance, and ultra-nationalist ethos they attempted to combat under circumstances of intense right-left political conflict within the German student body (Jarausch, 2014, pp. 333–392). The liberal student associations were thus “free” in the sense of being unincorporated and open to all, thus providing an academic home for Jewish, socialist and democrat students (Birnbaum, 1918).

The array of youth groups participating in the Freistudenten or Freideutsche movement can be gathered from the variety of associations that invited German youth to attend a “festival of youth”, held at Hohe Meißner in Hesse on the weekend of 11–12 October 1913. The invitation printed in the September issue of a leading youth-movement journal — Der Anfang: Zeitschrift der Jugend — declared that youth had reached a turning point in its striving for a new form and a conduct of life (Lebensform and Lebensführung). This would supersede the culture of the older generation and give expression to the rejuvenated currents of spiritual life coursing through young German veins, inspiring them to face the highest challenges of humanity. The host groups listed at the end of the invitation included the Deutsche Akademische Freischule (dedicated to reforming student lifestyles), Deutscher Bund abstinenten Studenten (a student temperance association), the (life-reforming and pacificist) Deutscher Vorrüpperbund, various branches of the Wandervogel movement (free spirits combining a love of nature and hiking with moral idealism), and the Frei Schulgemeinde (free-school community FSG) (Deutsche-Akademische-Freischule, 1913, pp. 129–131). Led by the charismatic Gustav Wyneken, who had mentored both Schwab and Benjamin, the FSG was an educational and lifestyle reform movement dedicated to the idea that youth could best realize its spiritual potential in isolated rural boardings schools, free from the corrupting influence of parents and the older generation.

To the extent that this loose affiliation of educational- and life-reformers possessed any kind of intellectual or ideological cohesion it was provided by the manner in which its intellectual leadership sought to give shape to the spiritual development of youth through German idealist philosophy. This provided a broadly shared inner culture and spiritual outlook that overlapped with the “liberal” or philosophical variants of Protestantism and Judaism. Writing under the pen-name of “Ardor”, the 19 year-old Walter Benjamin thus published an apologia for the FSG in which he argued that Wyneken’s educational reforms were driven not by any particular politics or program but by the mission of placing “metaphysics” at the center of schooling. Benjamin understood metaphysics in terms of the presence of an objective Geist or “objective spirit”, whose bearer was humanity, and to which students must subordinate their individual subjectivity in pursuit of spiritual insight and community. Declaring that “All ideal goods — language and science, law and morality, art and religion — are expressions of this objective spirit,” Benjamin argued that socialism, evolutionary doctrine, and technology had already transformed the world into an object of the human spirit, and reminded his readers that “The acknowledged philosophical representative of this viewpoint is above all Hegel” (Benjamin [Ardor], 1911, p. 80).

Two years later in a discussion of “education and valuation” Benjamin would continue this line of argument, declaring that German schools were failing to show how cultural history could draw value-judgments from an account of the way in which law, education, art and ethics had evolved as expressions of the objective spirit. This was because cultural history was not being taught in schools, while political history refrained from value-judgments, and history teaching in general transmitted disconnected facts and dates from which no developmental tendencies and valuations could be drawn (Benjamin [Ardor], 1913a, pp. 8–10). The young should thus seek “experience” (Erfahrung) rather than mere factual knowledge. Thiers would not be the spiritless quotidian experience of the older generation, however, but an experience that lay beyond experience, in a future that would be untouched by the brutal facticity of the present, and that the student would find only within his own Geist, where he would enter into community with the other young spirits (Benjamin [Ardor], 1913b, pp. 169–171).

In the paper “Beruf und Jugend” that he published in a radical literary journal in 1917 — and that formed part of the immediate context to which Weber’s lecture responded — Alexander Schwab followed the same intellectual path as Benjamin, activating the dialectical method of a fully internalized Hegelianism (Schwab, 1917). He used this method to shape a prophetic persona through which he could discern the spiritual condition of the age and the future form of humanity. Schwab thus declared that humanity was driven by two opposed forces, “life” and “idea” (life and spirit, life and understanding). From the former
flowed all of the powers of life and death, procreation and passion; and from the latter, man’s ethical ideals and knowledge, his capacity for the creation of beauty and community. The problem of the present age was that “west-European-American humanity” had lost the capacity to reconcile these two poles that had been so beautifully harmonized by the Greeks.

Drawing on the same left-Hegelian thought-figures that would reach down to Habermas, Schwab uncannily anticipated the latter’s diagnosis of a society governed by a technical rationality and cut off from the values of the life-world. On the one hand, Schwab argued, aided by Kant’s rationalist destruction of substantive metaphysics, an abstracted “Ratio” had come to rule over the weakened forces of life, subjecting them to a merely technical rationality associated with commerce, politics and Brotstudium, having lost touch with the ultimate values embedded in the world of life. On the other hand, severed from the shaping force of ennobling ideals, life had become degraded into the meaningless pursuit of wealth and security, and the crudest of passions and sensations (ibidem, pp. 100–102). Schwab then names Beruf or vocation as both the symbol and the fact of modern society’s failure to integrate “life” and “idea”, and as the central obstacle to youth’s striving to realize objective spirit: “Vocation (Beruf) is the core of our spiritual and social situation. (Today the war is the dominant instance, but vocation is the core). Vocation is the effect and in turn the cause of the estrangement of spirit; it is both symbol and fact [...] in fact the indelible characteristic of this west-European-American middle-class world” (ibidem, p. 103).

Schwab’s dialectical figuration of life and idea thus drew a Benjaminian evaluation of culture from a “scientific” account of its structure and development, simultaneously delivering a prophetic insight into its future: the eventual reconciliation of the opposed forces of life and Geist. This would not be brought about by educational reform, social revolution, or the improvement of working conditions, Schwab prophesied, but only through a “clear knowledge and living feeling for the relation between the simplest fundamental powers of our existence: life and spirit.” Only thus would it be possible for life to receive the shaping and ennobling power of understanding without being instrumentalized, and the understanding to be filled with the “blood and power and sensuous beauty” of life without being enslaved by it: “To grasp the one as one and as a whole is only granted to an inner intuition, to express it is vested only in prophets, and to represent it only in artists” (ibidem, p. 106).

3 Weber’s Lecture

That Weber regarded the disposition of his Munich audience as largely determined by the cultural politics of the youth movement is clear throughout “Science as a Vocation”, but especially so in some remarks near the end. After castigating academics for failing to face up to their fateful historical situation — in which the scientific disciplines have destroyed all transcendent values and meanings — and for seeking to evade this situation by claiming prophetic insight and leadership, Weber turned to the “religious” interpretation that the youth movement had imposed on its community. While avoiding the “swindle and self-deception” of the professorial prophets, and in fact containing something “sincere and genuine”, nonetheless, “there is perhaps a misunderstanding of their own significance when those youth groups that, having quietly grown up in recent years, have ascribed to their own relations of human community the significance of religious, cosmic or mystical relations [...] dubious as it appears to me whether the dignity of purely human communal relations is elevated by such religious interpretations” (Weber, 1992, p. 109).

This gentle warning to the students about interpreting their forms of youthful fellowship in such overblown terms as objective Geist was preceded by Weber’s forceful rejection of the youth-movement’s demands that the scholarly vocation should be valued to the extent that it permitted the cultivation of an authentic “personality” or gave expression to a heightened “experience” of life and spirit, rather than for the mastery of scholarly methods and expertise (ibidem, pp. 84–85). In making such demands of academic learning, under the pressures of war and political turbulence, the free-student groups were asking their teachers to provide ultimate moral justifications for the scientific vocation, of the sort once provided by religion and metaphysics. The Freistudenten had thus begun to look for cultural prophets and political leaders in the lecture hall, where they found all too many academics prepared to abandon their offices as teachers and researchers in order to step into these grandiloquent roles (ibidem, pp. 101–102).

Despite showing a limited sympathy for the student groups making these demands — while none at all for the “swindling” academics who sought to satisfy them — Weber’s response to his audience was uncom-
promising. Acknowledging that the duty of an academic teacher cannot be "demonstrated scientifically", Weber continued:

One can only demand of the teacher that he have the intellectual integrity to see that it is one thing to state facts, to determine mathematical or logical relations or the internal structure of cultural values, while it is another thing to answer questions of the *value* of culture and its individual contents and the question of how one should *act* in the cultural community and in political associations. These are quite heterogeneous problems. If [the teacher] asks further why he should not deal with both types of problems in the lecture-room, the answer is: because the prophet and the demagogue do not belong on the podium of the lecture-room. (*ibidem* pp. 96–98)

The steely character of this response notwithstanding, it is important to observe that Weber regarded the heterogeneity of scholarly knowledge and value-judgments not as a universal truth — grounded, for example, in something like Kant’s distinction between the theoretical and practical dispositions of the intellect — but as a feature of the “historical situation” in which academics were fated to find themselves, hence as a product of the historical developments that had led to this situation.

In seeking to persuade his audience of the truth of the situation with which he confronted them, Weber abstracted from his detailed studies in the historical sociology of religion, law, and economy in order to identify two broad developments whose transformation of western culture, he argued, had opened the gap between the production of scientific knowledge and the making of cultural and political value-commitments. First, starting with the Greeks, certain practices of conceptualization and computation made it possible to approach nature as a domain of calculable entities. When combined with disciplined forms of observation and experimentation developed during the Renaissance, this “rationalizing” or disciplining of intellectual conduct allowed the world to be viewed as open to technical knowledge and transformation, hence as “disenchanted” in the sense of no longer being governed by divine or transcendent forces open to magical knowledge and control. As a result, scientific knowledge had come to be governed by methodological presuppositions internal to particular disciplines, which meant that it became impossible to view science as the path to true knowledge of being or God, or thence to provide an overarching value-justification for the scientific vocation, whose justifications became internal to acceptance of particular methodized disciplines (*ibidem*, pp. 88–93).

Second, in part because of the diverse modes and directions in which intellectual conduct had been historically disciplined or rationalized, and in part because of more recent religious and political schisms, it had become impossible to invoke any ultimate value-sphere that might be transcendentally justified or else derived from a scientific account of culture or society. In a striking formulation that jolted many leading intellectuals, Weber thus declared that the “scientific” advocacy of ethical viewpoints is “meaningless in principle, as the different values-spheres (*Wertordnungen*) of the world stand in irreconcilable conflict with each other” (*ibidem*, p. 99). Flatly rejecting Kant’s claim to determine a universal moral law through philosophical reflection, and Hegel’s claim that such would arise from the social evolution of norms, Weber told his audience that after the decay of Christian philosophical universalism the different ethics associated with science, religion, politics and culture had assumed the form of a “war of the gods”, the outcomes of which were dependent on fate not science, and where students had to make their own choices (*ibidem*, pp. 100–101).

On the one hand, different disciplinary rationalizations of intellectual conduct had given rise to sciences capable of empirical knowledge of the world on the basis of its methodological objectifications, free of all value-judgments but thence incapable of ultimate moral justification. On the other hand, the “disenchantment” of the forms of transcendent being that had once permitted Christianity and its metaphysics to establish ultimate value-hierarchies meant that all value-spheres — culture, religion, politics, aesthetics — were characterized by the warring of ethical gods to be settled by combat not science. This was the fateful state of historical affairs that Weber demanded his audience face. He thus challenged the students to find their scientific vocation and personality by mastering the methods of one of the specialized disciplines; to renounce the pursuit of integrated personality and spiritual experience in the scientific domain; to refrain from preaching cultural and political values in the lecture hall; and, should they choose to do so, to pursue their political objectives in the separate domain of pitiless political combat — as Weber had done when
seeking candidacy in the liberal German Democratic Party, and in his writings on the conduct of the war and negotiations for peace.

It would be a significant misunderstanding, however, to presume Weber to have argued that because the sciences are capable of producing value-free knowledge, they are themselves without values or have no cultural meaning. In the first place, it is precisely because the empirical sciences are not based in objective or true knowledge of being, but rather in a disciplined conduct of the intellect — one that permits it to "objectify" a particular field of knowledge through the mastery of specific forms of conceptualization, calculation, and evidence-gathering — that Weber can treat scientific knowledge as involving the transmission of particular ethos or conduct of life (Lebensführung). Avoiding normative judgments in scientific knowledge thus requires transmitting ascetic norms that permit the formation of a methodologically ordered and empirically grounded conduct of the intellect. In his essay on “The Meaning of ‘Ethical Neutrality’ [Wertfreiheit] in Sociology and Economics” of 1917, Weber summarized these norms as: to fulfill a given disciplinary task in a dedicated fashion; to recognize facts, especially those inconvenient for one’s own position, and distinguish them from value-judgments; and to subordinate oneself to the scientific task and refrain from pushing one’s own values, tastes and sentiments (Weber, 1949, p. 5). In the vocation lecture, Weber thus somewhat hesitantly characterized the cultivation of this scientific self-restraint as an “ethical achievement” (ibidem, p. 99). Secondly, an academic can “clarify” the meaning of scientific teaching in terms of the knowledge that it conveys regarding the rules of a specialist science, the immanent presuppositions of the science, and the dependency of the rules on the presuppositions (ibidem, pp. 103–104). Finally, by treating religious and moral values scientifically — that is by investigating them as particular historically conditioned ways of shaping conduct and viewing the world — the historical and social sciences can allow these values to be approached independently of their truth or falsity, that is, value-neutrally, and hence in an epistemic space able to be shared by those holding radically opposed religious and moral views, such as a Catholic and a Freemason (ibidem, p. 98).

4 The War of the Gods

The left-Hegelian attack on Weber’s conception of value-free sociology formed only part of a wide and diverse array of startled criticisms that his lecture triggered in the 1920s and 1930s (Lichtblau, 1996, pp. 392–540). This array included Erich von Kahler’s prophetic demand that Weber’s separation of science and values be overcome through the evolution of a new human spirit and body; Max Scheler’s insistence that the required synthesis would be achieved through philosophy; and Heinrich Rickert’s sympathetic neo-Kantian corrective, that philosophy could indeed still provide access to a transcendental truth lying beyond the specialist sciences (see extracts in Lassman and Velody, 1989). By the 1960s, however, consolidated in the work of the Frankfurt School, the left-Hegelian critique had become dominant.

If nothing else, Max Horkheimer’s participation in the 1964 Weber anniversary meeting of the German Sociological Congress demonstrated the remarkable continuity of German cultural-political factionalism; for Horkheimer had been among the Munich students who heard Weber lecture, on the topic of Soviet government, in 1919, the year before his death. No doubt tailoring his memories to the circumstances of the 1960s, Horkheimer recalled that he and his fellow students had high hopes that Weber would present an account of the Soviet attempt to forge a “better society”, providing them with a “theoretical reflection and analysis [...] whose every intellectual step would have led to a rational shaping of the future.” Instead, “Everything was so precise, so scientifically austere, so value-free, that we went home completely gloomy.” Still, all was not lost, for Weber’s conception of value-free sociology — which Horkheimer understood as restricting investigation to the instrumental means used to achieve presupposed ends — was undermined by the fact of Weber’s conflict with the conservative student corporations. This showed to Horkheimer’s satisfaction that Weber’s sociology was not really value-free, and that “sociology cannot be so completely divorced from philosophical obligation” (Horkheimer, 1971, pp. 51–53).

Horkheimer’s anecdotes expressed the political commitments and metaphysics of the Schwab and Benjamin generation, and did so by invoking the role of sociology in a “rational shaping of the future” that Weber had inveighed against in his 1917 vocation lecture. At the same time, his remarks also reflected the increased academic influence that this kind of “social metaphysics” had gained during the interwar years, and then again after the hiatus of the war. This influence was due not least to the endowment of an in-

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stitution for the specific purpose of teaching Marxist and left-Hegelian doctrine, the Institute for Social Research or “Frankfurt School”, directed by Horkheimer in the early 1930s, and to which he returned from American exile after its re-establishment in 1950. It was left to the leading representative of the Frankfurt School’s second generation — Horkheimer’s former student Jürgen Habermas — to formulate the left-Hegelian counter-attack on Weber’s conception of value-free social science, providing a template for the anti-Weberian academic cultural politics of the 1960s that remains in full cry today.

Habermas’s central strategy was to treat Weber’s historical and sociological studies as a general theory of society — no doubt assisted by the postwar American reception of Weber in these terms (Tribe, 1988) — and hence as accountable to a philosophical history of the kind found in Hegelianism and Marxism. Since the rise of 1830s Hegelianism, this kind of philosophical history had allowed its adherents to conceive society as a dialectical whole, evolving through the manner in which the forms of rationality (ideas) to which it gives rise have the possibility of grasping their own social determination and hence bringing society under the sway of rationally grounded norms (Simon, 1928, pp. 156–184). According to Habermas, Weber’s studies in the sociology of law, bureaucracy, religion and economy were all grounded in an underlying philosophical history of the progressive “rationalization” of all spheres of social life, with this conception providing the unacknowledged normative grounding of Weberian sociology and the key to its hermeneutic operation (Habermas, 1971, p. 62; 1981, pp. 157–185).

Ignoring Weber’s repeated warnings that rationalization did not refer to a general process, and that different spheres of life were rationalized in quite different directions, using different means and for different purposes, Habermas tagged Weber with a single general philosophical-historical conception of rationalization: namely, the use of instrumentally rational means (Zweckrationalität) in order to realize ends that were presupposed for purely technical purposes. This allowed Habermas to argue that Weber’s social theory was stranded between an objective account of social relations governed by technical rationality and a subjectivist conception of normative ends for which no social basis or justification could be provided, leaving him at the mercy of a politically dangerous decisionism. Habermas’s Weber lacked a dialectical conception of the relation between social relations and rationality, according to which socially-determined reason becomes conscious of its own determination (as the estranged form of social relations) freeing it for a moral governance of society. As a result, this Weber had committed himself to an instrumental conception of rationality that reduced sociology to the production of “technically utilizable knowledge” and left social and political norms in the domain of arbitrary choice and charismatic imposition (Habermas, 1971, pp. 63–65).

Placed in this alien intellectual context, Weber’s account of the emergence of empirical sciences from the conceptual and experimental disciplining of intellectual conduct lost its historical character. By assimilating it to a general theory of social rationalization — but one that lacked a properly dialectical account of the relation between ideal norms and social reality — Habermas could treat Weber’s historical sociology of the value-free sciences as a disguised expression of the latter’s own value-commitment to technical reason and subjectivized morality:

This is also the context in which the academic-political demand for value-freedom has its particular significance. The empirical sciences (Erfahrungswissenschaften) are part of the general process of rationalization in a two-fold manner. They have disenchanted the world and deprived action-orienting values and norms of their claim to objective validity. To this extent they have altogether ceded pride of place to individual decision between subjectivized faith-factions (Glaubensmächten). On the other hand, like bureaucracy, the empirical sciences also tend to usurp the space of decision that they initially opened, which means that they must be restricted to the role of technical aids. (Habermas, 1971, pp. 64–65).

In other words, rather than being an ineluctable feature of the “historical situation”, for Habermas the difference that Weber called on his students to confront — the difference between knowing an historical phenomenon on the basis of an empirical science, and evaluating it on the basis of cultural, political or religious norms — was actually a product of Weber’s own failure to commit to a dialectical theory of society. As outlined in Habermas’s extraordinarily sophisticated magnum opus, this was a theory in which social relations would give rise to a form of intersubjective or “communicative” rationality that was capable of determining social agreement on ultimate norms for politics and society. A professor of sociology could
then proclaim these norms to students, speaking as the voice of social reason (Habermas, 1981, pp. 8–42 & 273–338).

In discussing the character of this critique it is necessary to begin by observing that Habermas makes no attempt to show the empirical inaccuracy of any of Weber’s particular studies — of bureaucracy, law, ascetic Protestantism, the economic ethics of the world religions — because his objective is to reject Webersian empirical historical sociology as such. Habermas’s criticism of Weber’s Protestant Ethic thus does not question the accuracy of Weber’s account of the role of ascetic Protestantism in producing an “irrational” methodizing of life in pursuit of signs of grace. Rather, Weber is taken to task for failing to grasp the role of this Protestantism in the great dialectic between “social structure” and “social consciousness”. In fact Habermas convicted Protestantism itself of failing to mediate this dialectic, arguing that it had failed to realize the normative and rational horizons that had been opened by the destruction of the traditional “mythic” cosmos. Instead, it had closed these horizons within an irrational ascetic lifestyle, which Weber merely described, thence failing to grasp ascetic Protestantism’s deeper philosophical-historical meaning (Habermas, 1981, pp. 220–228).

In thus refusing to engage Weber’s account on a shared intellectual ground formed by common norms of empirical validity — and instead diagnosing Weber himself as a symptom of Protestantism’s supposed failure to mediate social structure and social consciousness in a communicative social understanding — Habermas did not treat Weber as a dialogue partner engaged in a shared process of understanding and norm-formation. Rather, he interpreted Weber’s value-free empirical account of ascetic Protestantism as excluding its author from the great dialectical conversation through which society had been clarifying its own normative grounds. This meant that Weber’s empirical approach had to be relinquished before its author could be admitted to the “dialogical” space of the Frankfurt School, in which ultimate values would be derived from a special kind of social theory.

Rather than attempting to engage with Weber’s conception of value-freedom on the basis of shared norms of knowledge, Habermas’s account was thus designed to eliminate it from discussion and replace it with a factional social metaphysics. First emerging as a cultural-political movement in the form of 1830s Hegelian philosophical history (Simon, 1928, pp. 156–184), this metaphysics had played an important role in the formation of right- and left-Hegelian political sects surrounding the 1848 revolution (Stedman Jones, 2011), before flowing into the student movement addressed by Weber in his 1917 vocation lecture, and then finding institutional embodiment in the Frankfurt School that had been richly endowed by partisans in the 1924 (Wiggershaus, 1995, pp. 9–40). In order to demonstrate this case it is first necessary to remove Weber’s conception of value-free empirical knowledge from the dialectical account in which the Frankfurt School sought to inter it. This will indeed entail showing that Weber’s conception of value-freedom is quite unlike the account that Habermas provides of it, but the ultimate purpose of this demonstration will not be to falsify that account. Instead, it will be to show that rather than offering a (falsifiable) description of Weber’s conception, Habermas’s account was an intellectual weapon designed to supplant it on behalf of a hostile cultural-political faction.

The first observation to make in this regard is that Weber’s conception of rationalization was not the object of a general theory, grounded in a philosophical history comparable with Hegelianism or Marxism, and assuming the single general form of an instrumentalized technical rationality. As Wilhelm Hennis in particular has shown, Weber dispersed rationalization across a number of particular studies, treating it not as a general idea or form of reason, but as a diverse array of intellectual practices for the ordering and disciplining — thus “rationalizing” — of inner and outer forms of conduct (Hennis, 1988, pp. 23–24 & 38–46). In the context of his discussion of the Protestant ethic, Weber thus famously wrote that:

A simple sentence should stand at the center of every study that delves into “rationalism”. It must not be forgotten that one can in fact “rationalize” life from a vast variety of ultimate vantage points. Moreover, one can do so in very different directions. “Rationalism” is a historical concept that contains within itself a world of contradictions. [...] What interests us here is precisely the ancestral lineage of that irrational element which lies in this, as in every, conception of a “calling” (Weber, 2011, p. 98).

The impropriety of tying Weber to a philosophical history of the spread of an instrumentalized technical rationalism becomes particularly apparent from his account of the rationalization of life under the
regime of “ascetic Protestantism”. Here, far from viewing it in terms of the instrumental realization of presupposed technical goals, Weber treats rationalization as a regime of life centered on the “irrational” Calvinist doctrine of predestination. He argues that in dealing with the anxiety regarding salvation induced by this doctrine, the Calvinist faithful were advised to consider themselves as among the elect, and thence to search for the signs of their election not in the sacraments of a church, but in their everyday conduct (Weber, 2011, pp. 115–137). As a result, the daily life of Calvinists became the object of intense ascetic scrutiny and disciplining, leading to a characteristic rationalization of inner and outer conduct. Rather than being the instrumental means of reaching a technical objective, this rationalizing or disciplining was a spiritual exercise aimed at transforming the self in order to attain an “irrational” spiritual condition.

From this we can derive a second observation. It is a central feature of Weber’s conception of value-free empirical knowledge that forms of reasoning and ethical norms are not viewed as ideas that might be true or false, or as “social consciousness” that might dialectically reflect a separate domain of “material” social relations. In fact it is a point of maximum difference between Weber and the Frankfurt School that he did not treat forms of reasoning and ethics in accordance with the latter’s dialectical — ideal-material — ontology but in a completely different way: namely, as intellectual actions or modes of conducting the intellect in the course of leading a particular kind of life, or what Weber called Lebensführungen — conducts of life. Weber thus approached the Calvinist doctrine of predestination neither as a true or false theological idea, nor as a distorted ideational reflection of capitalist social relations. Rather, he described it as a means of self-problematization that establishes a new relation to the self — in terms of radical inner uncertainty regarding one’s state of grace — and inaugurates a highly disciplined way of conducting the self in order to secure the signs of grace in daily life. In this regard, Weber’s empirical treatment of ethics and rationality as modes of self-conduct is strikingly similar to Michel Foucault’s late approach to ethics through a history of “practices of the self” — arts of ethical problematization and self-transformation carried out as a “work of the self on the self” — as recent studies have illuminated (Gordon, 2014).

In the essay on “the meaning of value-freedom in the sociological and economic sciences” that he published in the same year as the “Science as a Vocation” lecture, Weber formulated this approach in a core methodological protocol. Here he stated that the empirical sciences transformed normatively valid truths (in ethics, philosophy, theology, mathematics) into describable social phenomena by treating them not as manifestations of transcendental ideas or norms but as types of conduct. Thus, “When the normatively valid is the object of empirical investigation, it loses its character as a norm, and is treated in terms of its ‘existence’ and not its ‘validity’” (Weber, 1949, p. 39). As a result, “Every science of intellectual or social relations is a science of human conduct (Sickeinhalten), (such that all acts of thought and all psychological attitudes fall under this concept)” (Weber, 1949, p. 40). In other words, ethical, intellectual, and social phenomena could be approached independently of their normative validity — that is, value-neutrally — by transforming them into forms of human conduct or comportment open to historical and sociological investigation and description.

Third, it thus becomes clear that Weber’s conception of value-free historical and social sciences came not from the fact that he too was caught up in the spread of instrumental technical rationality — leaving him at the mercy of moral subjectivism and decisionism — but from quite different historical sources: namely, from the highly various methods of conceptualization, calculation, interpretation, observation and experiment through which particular phenomena had been transformed into objects of empirical description and interpretation in various fields, as exemplified in the historical transformation of ethics and religion into describable forms of human conduct. Weber regarded these methods neither as Kantian transcendental conditions of possible experience, nor as Hegelianized versions of these, such as proposed in Habermas’s conception of idealized social dialogue as the source of universally (intersubjectively) valid norms of social knowledge and action. Rather, he viewed scientific rationality too as a form of intellectual conduct, treating its methods as practices of the self whose combined ethical and technical disciplining of intellectual activities — mathematical calculation, experimental observation, philological interpretation, historical contextualization, and so on — permitted the objectification of particular fields of phenomena. It has already been observed that Weber regarded the adoption of a value-free empirical stance as dependent on the historical and pedagogical transmission of certain ethical disciplines and abilities: to doggedly master scientific tasks and methods, to discipline oneself to recognize facts, particularly “inconvenient facts”, and to refrain from projecting one’s value-commitments into fields of empirical investigation (We-
ber, 1949, p. 5). In the face of demands like Benjamin’s call for a supra-disciplinary spiritual “experience”, and Schwab’s call to repudiate Beruf in favor of the integration of “ideas” and “life” in a authentic “personality”, Weber insisted that the vocation and personality of the scientist consisted in the self-restraining mastery of a specific set of ethical and technical abilities. These belonged not to an objective Geist embodied in humanity, but to the historically specific personality of the professional scientist: “Thus it would be to deprive ‘vocation’ of its only really important remaining meaning were one not to perform the specific type of self-restraint that it requires” (Weber, 1949, p. 6).

5 The Sociology of Religion and Philosophical Faith

Rather than devolving from a general technical rationality lacking normative grounds, Weber’s value-free investigations arose from methods for historicizing ethical phenomena that were historically specific and dependent on the ethical and technical disciplining of the investigator’s intellectual conduct. Limiting our attention to the intellectual means that Weber used to investigate religions in a value-free manner — that is, the means that made it possible to view religions in terms of the historical “existence” of ascetic disciplines and modes of conducting the self, setting aside their “normative validity” — it can be observed that he derived these from the disciplines of ecclesiastical history and the history of theology. In the annotated bibliographical footnote to his discussion of ascetic Calvinism in the Protestant Ethic, Weber listed a large number of his sources from these disciplines — including specialist works by Kampschulte, Fruin, Nuyens and Köhler and more famous studies by Ranke, Troeltsch, Carlyle, Macaulay and Masson — which he cited both as authorities and also as the means by which readers could verify his account (Weber, 2011, pp. 321–322).

Of particular significance for our present concerns is a work that Weber cites as one of his key sources: Matthias Schneckenburger’s lectures comparing Calvinist and Lutheran theological doctrines. For Schneckenburger had presented these lectures in the 1840s when the Prussian government’s attempt to unify the two Protestant confessions had provoked furious religious debate as to the nature of true Protestantism (Clark, 1996; 2000). In seeking to distance himself from this debate and adopt an “impartial” viewpoint, Schneckenburger declared that he would describe theological doctrines — including the Calvinist doctrine of predestination — independently of their truth or falsity, and that he would do so by approaching them historically, in terms of their psychological effects on the conduct of their adherents (Schneckenburger, 1856, pp. 34–37).

In thus proposing to withdraw from irresolvable conflicts over religious truth, and to approach religions value-neutrally, as a plurality of historical forms of psychological or spiritual discipline, Schneckenburger’s account channeled the empirical methods of “erudite” ecclesiastical and theological history. These methods for suspending the transcendent meaning and truth of religious texts and doctrines, and treating them as records of purely human historical activities, had first been developed for the purposes of Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-century biblical criticism and ecclesiastical history. Here their capacity to suspend religious meaning and truth, and to treat religions as historical phenomena, had been put to a variety of cross-cutting uses — to claim apostolic lineage, attack metaphysical theology, relativize and pluralize religions for the purposes of juridical pacification — without however losing their power to constitute religion as an object of trans-confessional scientific scholarship (Backus, 2003; Lehmann-Brauns, 2004; Levitin, 2012). In citing Schneckenburger as a key source, Weber was thus signaling that his value-free sociology of religion could be regarded as borrowing the methods of empirical historicization and distanciation that had permitted early modern ecclesiastical and theological historiographies to approach religions in terms of their existence rather than their truth, under conditions of radical religious conflict.

The fact that they were embedded in specialized (and permanently contested) historicizing and neutralizing disciplines, however, meant that the scientific and ethical norms underpinning the value-free sociology of religion could not themselves be “scientifically” justified or advocated. In providing the ethical and scientific techniques that permitted sacred texts to be interpreted as records of wholly human activities related to the cultivation of religious styles of life, biblical criticism and ecclesiastical history had indeed opened up religions to empirical modes of investigation. In doing so solely by disciplining and specializing the intellectual conduct and comportment of the religious scholar, however, the normative outlook associated with such empirical disciplines could not be justified in terms of a universal or transcendental
rationality and normativity. Rather than being part of an epochal rationalization or secularization of culture and society, this was the outlook only of those whose specialized intellectual and ethical disciplining allowed them to view religions as historical phenomena independently of their truth or falsity. To adopt this viewpoint it was thus not necessary that the spiritual beliefs of all religious adherents should undergo some kind of epochal rational transformation, as it was if their intersubjective agreement were viewed as the source of universal norms of communicative reason. All that was required, rather, was that the religious beliefs and commitments of those undertaking scientific work should be suspended for the purposes and duration of historical investigation and description.

Despite thus denying that “empirical-psychological and historical analysis” of religious ethics could provide a universal evaluation of them, Weber nonetheless argued that such a verstehende Erklärung or interpretive explanation could be supplied with a non-transcendental justification. This was not least because by allowing religions to be viewed as historical ethical comportments, this approach permitted communication between scholars who otherwise adhered to radically opposed religious or ethical beliefs (Weber, 1949, pp. 13–14; 1992, p. 98). At the same time, the adoption of this distantiated outlook could not be compelled by rationally binding social norms — such as those that Habermas claims arise from idealized social dialogue — since the outlook is internal to the ethical and intellectual disciplines of the scientific conduct of life. This means that should religious believers, whose life-conduct is shaped by quite another kind of spiritual discipline, refuse to adopt the empirical disciplines that would turn their beliefs into historical phenomena, then the scientific approach cannot produce norms capable of invalidating their stance.

At this point the professor should not attempt to draw an evaluation of religious conduct from a philosophical-historical or social-theoretical account of it, for to presume that the scientific outlook could itself be scientifically justified would be to cross the line into prophecy and demagogy. The choice to be made under such circumstances cannot be scientifically or rationally determined, since “the ultimate possible attitudes toward life are irreconcilable and their struggles irresolvable,” and the scientific comportment or vocation is itself one of these. At this point, all that a professor can do is exhort his students to have the “integrity” to recognize the difference between describing ethical and religious conducts as historical phenomena and evaluating them in terms of their normative validity — the central purpose of Weber’s “Science as a Vocation” lecture — leaving them to make their own religious and ethical valuations on the basis of “personal” commitments, independent of their scientific training and vocation (Weber, 1992, pp. 104–105).

The views held by Schwab, Benjamin and Horkheimer in 1917-1920 testify to the fact that many of the ears on which Weber’s exhortation fell were quite deaf to it, as do the views held by Horkheimer and Habermas in the 1960s. Listening as they were to the voice of objective Geist, the intellectual senses of these thinkers were not tuned by the methods of empirical ecclesiastical history to the presence of religion as an historical phenomenon. Rather their attention was focused by another kind of intellectual discipline altogether. This was supplied by the metaphysical philosophies and philosophical histories of Kant and Hegel, which, since the 1830s had shown how religions could be treated in a quite different, philosophical-historical manner: namely, as partial manifestations of transcendental rational norms by which they could also be evaluated.

Turning their backs on empirical ecclesiastical historiographies, Kant and Hegel had portrayed the rival confessional religions — what Kant called the “empirical” or “historical” religions and Hegel “determinate” or “positive” religion — as historical manifestations of an underlying transcendental reason or spirit (Hegel, 1988, pp. 391–413; Kant, 2009, pp. 113–120). While they had been needed to guide humanity during its period of rational immaturity, Kant and Hegel taught that the historical and positive confessional religions were destined to be transformed into forms of rational-moral self-governance or pure spiritual self-consciousness. This would happen through a dialectical philosophical history that would progressively purify (sublate) the merely statutory, inculcatory and historical form of religion — essentially the story of Christ’s incarnation, death and resurrection in atonement for human sin — while simultaneously transposing religion’s universal norms into the register of transcendental moral philosophy, the “pure religion of reason”, or a “communal spiritual consciousness” that would supersede religion as the highest stage of human morality. (Hegel, 1988, pp. 470–489; Kant, 2009, pp. 120–137). From this perspective it was not the specialist empirical disciplines of ecclesiastical and theological history that constituted confessional religion as an object of “rational” knowledge for scholarly purposes, otherwise leaving it intact for believers. Rather it was human reason itself, as voiced through Kantian-Hegelian philosophy and philosophical history. In
treats historical religions as the estranged forms in which transcendental reason or the world spirit had manifested itself in time, this style of philosophy simultaneously prophesied the complete supersession or Aufhebung of these religions. This would see the transfer of their normative contents to philosophy itself, and the transformation of religious believers into “rational beings” and democratic citizens — an eschatology whose fulfillment is still awaited.

The price to be paid for this powerful rationalization of religion, however, was that Kantian and Hegelian philosophical histories of religion were themselves received, positively and negatively, as heterodox (pantheist, pelagian, rationalist) forms of religion (Scheidler, 1846; Hundeshagen, 1850), or as philosophical confessions in competition with Germany’s constitutionally recognized public religions (Hunter, 2005). This was in part because the anthropology and cosmology underpinning Kantian and Hegelian philosophies — the image of man as a double-sided rational and sensuous being whose dialectical purification would lead to intersubjective moral community — had been borrowed from Christian metaphysics and eschatology, making it difficult for many to regard these philosophies as fundamentally different from the confessional religions that they purported to supersede (Hunter, 2001, pp. 279–315; 2002; 2018). And it was in part because they were transmitted as a factional cultural politics or “fourth confession”, in competition with both the three constitutional religions, and the empirical historiographies and sociologies that historicized religion in a non-philosophical manner (Weir, 2014).

Like the Kantian and Hegelian philosophies on which it is based, Habermas’s sociology (or social metaphysics) of religious and ethical cultures is also characterized by the eschewal of empirical ecclesiastical and theological history and by the direct transposition of Kantian, Hegelian and Marxian views — of religions as manifestations of an underlying “ethical totality” — into the register of the theory of communicative reason. Habermas has helpfully summarized this transposition thus:

> With Hegel and Marx, it would have been a matter of not swallowing the intuition concerning the ethical totality back into the horizon of the self-reference of the knowing and acting subject, but of explicating it in accord with the model of unconstrained consensus formation in a communication community standing under cooperative constraints (Habermas, 1987, p. 295).

For Habermas what permits religions to be approached rationally is not the use of empirical methods to constitute them as historical life-conducts (Lebensführungen) and life-orders (Lebensordnungen), but the use of a philosophical image of them as the partially estranged historical manifestations of a transcendental world of norms and meanings that he calls the “life-world” (Lebenswelt) (Habermas, 2001, pp. 36–41). As a modestly attired presentation of Hegel’s objective Geist or world spirit, Habermas’s life-world permits him to approach religions not in a value-neutral way, as autonomous historical “practices of the self”, but in a value-prophetic manner, as estranged expressions of an “ethical totality” that will be realized through them in accordance with a philosophical-historical dialectic.

On this view, on the one hand, as purely empirical historical phenomena, the confessional religions are characterized as belief systems whose conflictual autonomy arises from their failure to reflectively recover their transcendental-rational underpinnings; but, on the other hand, as estranged expressions of the life-world’s common transcendental norms of reason and morality, the religions have the potential to rationalize (sublate) themselves and unite in the intersubjective retrieval of a once and future common moral world (Habermas, 2006, pp. 9–16). Using Kant as his exemplar, Habermas has declared that this transformation is being driven by an “Enlightenment” dialectic in which partisan religious adherents modify their particularistic confessions in order to enter a space of rational dialogue with their opponents. At the same time, an otherwise technical rationality is being morally transformed by absorbing the universal norms of intersubjective moral community that were previously the province of the religious confessions (Habermas, 2003, pp. 101–115). Habermas thus regards the dialectical rationalization of religious morality and moralization of technical reason as overcoming religious division by ushering in a new level of moral consciousness (Habermas, 2001, pp. 30–45). It will be recalled that this is the same dialectical philosophical history that the Frankfurt School has routinized in order to trap and dismember Weber. It thus never grows old for commentators to rehearse that on the one hand Weber’s value-free historical sociology is a slave to technical rationality, while on the other hand his ethical pluralism is a symptom of his failure to engage in the dialogical process through which society itself is producing the moral consciousness by which it can be understood and evaluated (Benhabib, 1981; Eich & Tooze, 2017).
It has already been shown that Weber’s value-free approach to religions and his value-pluralism are quite unlike Habermas’s account of them. Weber’s value-free religious sociology derived not from technical reason but from his appropriation of the methods of empirical ecclesiastical and theological history. And Weber’s value-pluralism arose not from some putative failure of transcendental moral reflexivity, but from his “Nietzschean” argument that the various (and often contradictory) rationalizations of different spheres of life had “disenchanted” the world in the sense of undermining the kind of transcendental normative grounding that had once been supplied by Christianity and post-Christian metaphysical philosophies such as Kantianism and Hegelianism. It now remains to be shown that Habermas’s critique does not provide a falsifiable account of Weber’s historical sociology because the theory of communicative reason from which it is launched is actually a transposed form of the Kantian-Hegelian “philosophical religion”, designed to function as a kind of academic confession and serve as a factional cultural politics.

Habermas is well aware of the danger of his own position being regarded as a “philosophical faith”, and he attempts to forestall this by declaring that his doctrine of communicative reason is actually a “formal theory”; that is, a theory based on the reflexive recovery of the universal form of moral reasoning — the dialogical determination of norms in an ideal speech situation — rather than advocacy for a particular substantive morality or cultural politics (Habermas, 2001, pp. 39–41). If we view Habermas’s ethics of communicative reason as a particular historical way of conducting the intellect (a Lebensführung), however, then there are several formidable obstacles that make it impossible to understand it as a formal theory in this sense. In the first place, until shown otherwise, it seems clear that Habermas’s account of dialogical ethical reasoning is grounded in a substantive or “comprehensive” metaphysical cosmology and anthropology, in fact transposed from Kantian and Hegelian metaphysics as already indicated. Habermas’s image of a cosmic life-world, conceived as the single unifying source of all transcendental concepts and norms, and thus avowedly lying beyond all empirical validation, can only draw its authority from the sheer inculcation of the Kantian anthropology of rational humanity and the Hegelian-Marxian cosmology of the self-evolving world spirit, placing it among Weber’s irreconcilable “ultimate possible attitudes toward life.”

Second, it can be observed that the role of this metaphysical anthropology and cosmology is to inaugurate a particular way of relating to and conducting a self. Just as Calvinist predestination initiates a specific inner anxiety over election that is overcome via “this-worldly asceticism”, so too Habermas’s dialectic of life-world and technical rationality is a means of initiating a particular kind of intellectual anxiety: namely, an inner anxiety over whether the empirical autonomy of the sciences is destroying the transcendental normative unity of human reason and intersubjective community, for which the social theorist thus feels personally responsible:

It is the task of critique to recognize domination as unreconciled nature even within thought itself. But even if thought had mastered the idea of reconciliation [...] How could it do so if thought is always [...] tied to operations that have no specifiable meaning outside the bounds of instrumental reason [...]? (Habermas, 1981, p. 384).

The Frankfurt School’s positing of a stalled mediation between a technical rationality and a fragmented decisionist morality can thus be understood as a particular practice of ethical self-problematization — a specific way of relating to the self as in need of ethical attention and work. Seen in this light, the philosophical-historical dialectic — as performed, for example, in the exercise of retrieving the imaginal transcendental-rational core of religions, while imbuing technical rationality with the now-rationalized religious norms of moral community — can be understood as a type of intellectual ascesis, or ethical “work of the self on the self” that certain academic intellectuals are called on to perform on themselves. This work is performed in order to realize a particular “ethical telos” or higher form of moral consciousness or self: one that is capable of prophetic insight into the future return of a metaphysically unified life-world after the period of technical fragmentation and “system”.

The third and final indicator of the “confessional” character of Habermas’s theory of communicative reason is the polemical and sectarian character of the cultural politics to which it gives rise. It has already been shown that Habermas’s critique of Weber’s value-free historical sociology is incapable of engaging it in a “de-confessionalized” space of empirical understanding. This is because Habermas’s depiction of Weber’s sociology as grounded in an instrumentalized technical rationality is wholly internal to the philosophical dialectic as the spiritual exercise of a particular academic faction. Here, Weber’s “one-sidedness” is an icon
for a moral failure that threatens the recovery of transcendental moral unity and hence the Habermasian’s personal ethical equilibrium. It is for this reason that Weber’s value-free sociology “must” symbolize the threat of technical rationality, just as his value-pluralism “must” threaten a decisionist fragmentation of moral community; for these are threats that the Habermasian theorist conjures in himself, as part of the inner exercise for cultivating the unified ethical comportment that is the ethical telos for a sectarian cultural politics and way of academic life.

6 Conclusion

The relationship between Weber’s value-free sociology and the Frankfurt School critique of it should itself be regarded as a striking exemplification of Weber’s account of the irreconcilability of the “ultimate possible attitudes toward life.” In treating it as stranded between a technical rationality and a decisionist ethics, Habermas’s account of Weber’s sociology can neither be validated nor falsified, for that account is internal to the operation of left-Hegelianism as a type of academic self-cultivation. Here its role is to induce a specialized intellectual anxiety in the theorist, and thence to initiate the dialectic as a spiritual exercise aimed at the recovery of imaginal ultimate social norms from dialogical self-reflection.

In providing a “scientific” historical description of Frankfurt School social philosophy as a particular ascetic discipline for relating to and conducting an ethical self, this essay does not presume that such a description can itself be scientifically or normatively justified, for the reasons outlined above. As Weber argued in the central message of “Science as a Vocation”, the best that a scholar can do in this regard is to exhort an academic audience to have the intellectual integrity to see that describing an ethical regimen as a type of conduct, and valuing it as the highest form of moral consciousness, are quite heterogeneous ways of conducting the intellect, and that only the former belongs in the lecture-hall. That such an exhortation will in many cases fall on deaf ears is itself a central feature of the historical situation in which academics continue to find themselves.
References


